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In response to Ruth Colker, The Disability Integration Presumption:  
Thirty Years Later, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 789 (2006). 
 
As with any social movement, it is impossible to speak simply of 
“the goals” of the American disability rights movement.  The move-
ment embraces an array of different people, with different disabilities, 
ideologies, and interests.  It therefore has a multiplicity of different 
goals, which are sometimes in tension with each other.
1
  But if there is 
one goal that has achieved near-consensus status among disability 
rights supporters, the goal of integration is a strong candidate.  Dis-
ability rights activists have frequently argued against isolating people 
with disabilities within disability-only institutions; rather, activists wish 
to ensure that people with disabilities are fully integrated into the na-
tion’s economic and civic life.  The major disability rights laws—the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Individuals with Dis-




When as prominent a scholar and disability rights supporter as 
Ruth Colker writes an article questioning the IDEA’s individualized 
integration presumption, then, it is a major event.
3
  Professor Colker’s 
 
 ∗ Apologies to John Monahan, Abolish the Insanity Defense?—Not Yet, 26 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 719 (1973). 
 
†
 Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development, 
Washington University School of Law.  Thanks to the University of Pennsylvania Law Re-
view for creating such a great forum and inviting me to participate in it.  Thanks also to 
Ruth Colker for writing a provocative and important article, and to Rebecca Hol-
lander-Blumoff and, as always, Margo Schlanger for helpful discussions of these issues.  
Work on this essay was supported by a summer research grant from Washington Uni-
versity Law. 
1
This point is central to my forthcoming book, SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND 
THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT (forthcoming 2008). 
2
For a discussion of the centrality of integration to the American disability rights 
movement, with a particular focus on the ADA, see Timothy M. Cook, The Americans 
with Disabilities Act:  The Move to Integration, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 393 (1991). 
3
Ruth Colker, The Disability Integration Presumption:  Thirty Years Later, 154 U. PA. L. 
REV. 789 (2006); see id. at 811 & n.86 (introducing the IDEA’s integration presumption 
rule).  To be sure, Professor Colker says that she does not believe the IDEA’s integra-
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article is admirably driven by the Enlightenment sensibility that facts, 
and not abstract ideology, should drive policy.  She is quite correct, in 
my view, that the disability rights movement does itself a disservice if it 
ignores the lessons of experience and clings to ideologically-driven 
policies that have not succeeded.
4
  Professor Colker has begun an im-
portant conversation—one that should be engaged critically and vig-
orously. 
Nonetheless, Professor Colker has not convinced me.  Her article 
fails to establish that the IDEA’s individualized integration presump-
tion imposes significant costs, and she seems to downplay significant 
benefits of that presumption.  As currently framed, the individualized 
integration presumption does not prevent a school district from pro-
viding a separate placement to a child with a disability when that is 
truly the best option for her.  It merely requires the school district to 
demonstrate that its chosen course is, in fact, the best option.  That 
burden, it seems to me, is fully justified.  Teachers and school officials 
too often simply find it easier to deal with people who are different by 
putting them aside in “special” settings rather than implementing the 
changes necessary to make the regular settings more accessible.  This 
is a recurring problem in disability rights law, and a number of Profes-
sor Colker’s examples of the supposed failure of integration seem in-
stead to reflect the education system’s refusal to provide true integra-
tion.  In the remainder of this essay, I will elaborate on these points. 
I.  THE COSTS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM:  HAS PROFESSOR COLKER MADE 
HER CASE? 
Although she argues against the individualized integration pre-
sumption, Professor Colker concedes that many children with disabili-
 
tion presumption should be abandoned entirely, but she would reframe the presump-
tion so that it merely requires that school districts provide an array of different settings 
for students with disabilities generally.  See id. at 801 (“If a school district is offering a 
range of educational options to children with disabilities in learning, then an integra-
tion presumption is not warranted.” (footnote omitted)).  Because Professor Colker’s 
proposal would eliminate the presumption that individual students should be placed 
in the most integrated setting appropriate to their disabilities—which is the essence of 
the integration presumption as I will defend it—I believe it proper to speak of her 
proposal as one for abolition of the individualized integration presumption. 
4
I have made a similar point before.  See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Has the Americans 
with Disabilities Act Reduced Employment for People with Disabilities?, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 527, 558-62 (2004) (arguing that disability rights advocates must confront, 
rather than deny, the data that suggest that the ADA has not moved many people with 
disabilities into the workforce). 
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ties will benefit from being placed in truly integrated settings.  Those 
children, she agrees, should receive integrated placements.  Her con-
cern is for other children, who she believes would benefit from being 
placed in more segregated environments.  In her view, the individual-
ized integration presumption improperly directs the second group of 
children to the mainstream placements that will disserve them.
5
 
In arguing that the individualized integration presumption keeps 
children from placements they need, Professor Colker has a difficult 
task.  The integration presumption is, after all, just a presumption.  
The statutory provision creating it requires integration only “[t]o the 
maximum extent appropriate,” and it specifically contemplates that 
“special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with 
disabilities from the regular educational environment” will occur 
when “the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that 
education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and 
services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.”
6
  That provision, by its very 
terms, requires an individualized analysis to determine what place-
ment is “appropriate” for each child with a disability. 
Professor Colker’s indictment of the integration presumption fo-
cuses not on the statutory standard itself but on the cases that have in-
terpreted it.  She states that some courts have read the presumption in 
a way that requires integration even when that is not in the interest of 
the child with a disability.  But her evidence of that phenomenon is 
thin at best.  Professor Colker relies principally on two cases:  Roncker 
ex rel. Roncker v. Walter, decided by the Sixth Circuit in 1983; and 
Daniel R.R. v. State Board of Education, decided by the Fifth Circuit in 
1989.
7
  I doubt that two appellate cases, decided so long ago, can tell 
us much about the practice on the ground in school districts across 
the country today.  But neither Roncker nor Daniel R.R. makes Profes-
sor Colker’s point in any event. 
Professor Colker states that “[t]he integration presumption ap-
pears to have been irrebuttable in Roncker.”
8
  That seems to me a mas-
sive overreading of the case.  The Sixth Circuit expressly refrained 
from deciding whether Neill Roncker was entitled to a more inte-
grated placement.  It decided only that the district court had erred by 
 
5
See Colker, supra note 3, at 796 (arguing that the individualized integration pre-
sumption prevents appropriate education “for some children”). 
6
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2000) (emphasis added). 
7
See Colker, supra note 3, at 811-12, 814-21 (discussing Roncker ex rel. Roncker v. 
Walter, 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1983) and Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 
1036 (5th Cir. 1989)). 
8
Id. at 816. 
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reviewing the school district’s actions under an abuse of discretion 
standard; the court then remanded “in order to allow the district 
court to re-examine the mainstreaming issue in light of the proper 
standard of review.”
9
  In its one-page discussion of the legal standards 
to be applied on remand, the Sixth Circuit expressly contemplated 
“that some handicapped children simply must be educated in segre-
gated facilities either because the handicapped child would not bene-
fit from mainstreaming, [or] because any marginal benefits received 
from mainstreaming are far outweighed by the benefits gained from 
services which could not feasibly be provided in the non-segregated 
setting.”
10
  This is hardly the stuff of an “irrebuttable” presumption. 
Professor Colker notes the Sixth Circuit’s statement that Neill 
Roncker’s apparent lack of progress in the more integrated setting 
was “not dispositive.”
11
  Considered in context, however, the court’s 
point seems to me entirely sensible: 
Although Neill’s progress, or lack thereof, at Pleasant Ridge is a relevant 
factor in determining the maximum appropriate extent to which he can 
be mainstreamed, it is not dispositive since the district court must de-
termine whether Neill could have been provided with additional ser-
vices, such as those provided at the [segregated] county schools, which 
would have improved his performance at Pleasant Ridge.
12
 
In determining whether a more integrated placement is appropriate 
for a particular child, it certainly makes sense to consider that child’s 
past experience in integrated settings.  But it also makes sense to ask 
whether a child’s poor past experience reflected not anything inher-
ent in those settings, but simply the school district’s failure to ade-
quately support the child once she was placed there.  And that’s all 
the Sixth Circuit said.  I don’t see how Roncker reflects an “irrebut-
table” presumption of integration. 
Daniel R.R. lends even less support to Professor Colker’s argu-
ment.  After all, in that case the Fifth Circuit held that the more seg-
regated placement was the proper one for Daniel.
13
  In other words, 
after considering all the facts, the court concluded that the integra-
tion presumption was rebutted.  Nonetheless, Professor Colker asserts 
 
9
Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1062. 
10
Id. at 1063. 
11
Colker, supra note 3, at 815 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063). 
12
Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063. 
13
Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1050 (5th Cir. 1989). 
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that the court adopted a standard that would make it too hard to over-
come the presumption in other cases, by “requir[ing] that the school 
district demonstrate that Daniel could attain no educational benefit in 
the more integrated environment.”
14
  But Daniel R.R. imposed no such 
requirement, and Professor Colker does not point, in any event, to 
any subsequent cases that applied that precedent to demand that a 
child be placed in an inappropriate integrated setting.  The Daniel 
R.R. court merely required the school district to prove, on the basis of 
“an individualized, fact-specific inquiry,”
15
 “that education in the regu-
lar classroom cannot be achieved satisfactorily.”
16
  That inquiry, the 
court held, must not just look to “whether the child will receive an 
educational benefit from regular education,” but must also “examine 
the child’s overall educational experience in the mainstreamed envi-
ronment, balancing the benefits of regular and special education for 
each individual child.”
17
  That standard hardly suggests any particular 




Professor Colker is persuasive that not every child with a disability 
is best served in the most integrated setting possible.  But the integra-
tion presumption recognizes that point and requires nothing more 
than the most integrated setting appropriate to the individual child.  Al-
though mistakes will inevitably occur-–in both directions—in inter-
preting and applying such a fact-specific legal standard, Professor 
Colker has not demonstrated that the standard has in practice system-
atically pushed children with disabilities into inappropriate settings. 
II.  THE BENEFITS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM:  WHAT PROFESSOR COLKER 
UNDERSTATES 
Professor Colker has not established that the individualized inte-
gration presumption has the costs she attributes to it.  Equally impor-
tant, she significantly understates the benefits of the presumption.  
Professor Colker argues that the integration presumption’s initial 
purpose was a systematic one—to end the use of separate, disability-
only institutions as the only option for children with disabilities.
19
  
That point is fine as far as it goes, but the individualized integration 
 
14
Colker, supra note 3, at 820 (citing Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1050). 
15
Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048. 
16
Id. at 1050 (emphasis added). 
17
Id. at 1049. 
18
Colker, supra note 3, at 820. 
19
Id. at 795. 
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presumption continues to have value even in school districts that have 
an array of different placements for children with disabilities. 
The essential problem is that accommodating difference is rarely 
the easy path for an institution.  Professor Colker acknowledges that 
many children with disabilities will benefit from an integrated school 
setting.  But successful integration may require changes to the regular 
school environment and additional interventions to support the stu-
dents with disabilities.  As Professor Minow argued some time ago, 
those changes and interventions can end up improving the education 
of all children in the classroom—those with disabilities and those 
without.
20
  But absent an individualized integration presumption, that 
kind of beneficial integration is far less likely to occur.  Unless broken 
out of their inertia, too many school districts will readily conclude that 
integration is too hard to achieve, and that separate placements are an 
easy and effective solution.  Looking at the regular education setting 
only as it currently exists, school administrators will conclude that 
separate placements are better—even when integration (bolstered by 
changes to the regular setting) would promote more successful out-
comes. 
The history of disability in America is full of assertions—made by 
nondisabled parents and medical and educational professionals, 
among others—that people with disabilities are best served in sepa-
rate, “special” settings.
21
  I believe those assertions were made in good 
faith.  But time and again, they have proven wrong.  Too often our 
failure to appreciate the possibilities of integration, and our inability 
to break free from the inertia that has kept us from undertaking the 
necessary changes that could make our mainstream institutions acces-
sible, has led us to believe that segregation is the best way. 
The closing of Pennsylvania’s Pennhurst State School and Hospi-
tal provides one of the more dramatic examples of this phenomenon.  
As Professor Colker points out, “many parents and guardians” of 
Pennhurst residents joined the state in opposing deinstitutionaliza-
 
20
See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE:  INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND 
AMERICAN LAW 84-86 (1990) (highlighting, for example, a classroom setting in which 
course material is conveyed simultaneously by spoken word and sign language, and 
noting the positive impact this has on both deaf and nondeaf students). 
21
For a great discussion of this issue, see MARY JOHNSON, MAKE THEM GO AWAY:  
CLINT EASTWOOD, CHRISTOPHER REEVE & THE CASE AGAINST DISABILITY RIGHTS 84-115 
(2003).  At this point, I should note in the interest of full disclosure that I am a non-
disabled parent of a child with a disability. 
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tion.
22
  They did so because they thought their children with mental 
retardation—most of whom were by then adults—could not make it in 
integrated, community settings.  In one important case from Penn-
hurst, Youngberg v. Romeo ex rel. Romeo, the resident’s own lawyer con-
ceded that, “in light of the severe character of his retardation,” the 
resident could never be deinstitutionalized.
23
  But that concession 
turned out to be dramatically wrong.  Soon after his lawyer made that 
concession, “Nicholas Romeo moved to a community residence in 
Philadelphia,” where he thrived.
24
  Indeed, the closing of Pennhurst is 
widely considered to be a success, in which people with disabilities 
who were thought to need a segregated environment in fact did better 
when they moved to more integrated settings in the community.
25
  It is 
odd that Professor Colker treats the case as a negative example. 
Many of Professor Colker’s reasons for why segregated settings 
might be better suggest inertia, rather than anything inherently wrong 
with integrated ones.  Professor Colker states, as one reason why sepa-
rate settings can be better, that children with learning disabilities “are 
often not accepted by their classroom teacher” in regular classrooms.
26
  
She also quotes a study that states, “[T]he instructional adaptations 
that general educators make in response to students’ persistent failure 
to learn are typically oriented to the group, not to the individual, and 
are relatively minor in substance . . . .”
27
  To accept these points as ar-
guments against an integration requirement is simply to acquiesce to 
resistance to that requirement.  If schools and teachers are refusing to 
accommodate children with disabilities in the regular learning envi-
ronment, the solution is to make them change.  That sort of resistance 
is a principal target of disability rights laws—it is not an argument for 
refusing to apply those laws. 
To be clear, my point is not that every child with every disability 
should be fully included in the mainstream setting.  My point is only 
that many children with disabilities should be in more integrated set-
tings than school officials think.  The individualized integration pre-
 
22
Colker, supra note 3, at 792 n.6 (citing Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class 
Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1211-12 (1982)). 
23
457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982). 
24
Cook, supra note 2, at 443. 
25
For a detailed examination of the aftermath of Pennhurst’s closure, see JAMES 
W. CONROY & VALERIE J. BRADLEY, THE PENNHURST LONGITUDINAL STUDY:  COMBINED 
REPORT OF FIVE YEARS OF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS (1985). 
26
Colker, supra note 3, at 834. 
27
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Douglas Fuchs & Lynn S. 
Fuchs, What’s “Special” About Special Education?, 76 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 522, 528 (1995)). 
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sumption is an important response to that problem. 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Colker has been studying, defending, and enforcing dis-
ability rights laws since I was in high school.  When a scholar with her 
prominence and track record begins an important debate like this, it 
is one that must be engaged.  And the sensibility that underlies her 
argument is exceptionally important:  if the IDEA’s individualized in-
tegration presumption is harming children with disabilities, we need 
to know that and change our policies accordingly. 
Professor Colker is persuasive that not all children with disabilities 
are best served in the most integrated setting possible.  But she has 
not shown that the IDEA has pushed children into inappropriately in-
tegrated settings in significant numbers.  Nor has she dispelled the 
concern that abolishing the individualized integration presumption 
would drive significant numbers of children with disabilities back to 
inappropriately segregated placements.  Unless she and other critics can 
fill in these gaps in their case against the individualized integration 
presumption, there is no reason to abolish it. 
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